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Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty: The 
Legislative Veto and the Delegation of 
Authority 
Stanley C Brubaker* 
On the 23rd of June, 1983, the Supreme Court declared un-
constitutional a section of the Immigration and Nationalization 
Act authorizing the legislative veto.I On that day, in that single 
decision, the Court implied the unconstitutionality of more provi-
sions in more federal laws than in all its other decisions combined 
smce 1789.2 With such an impact, the decision's reasoning should 
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. My thanks to Jeffrey 
Tulis and Barry Warren for their co=ents on an earlier draft of this article. Support for 
the research was provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities. 
I. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). Jagdish 
Rai Chadha, an East Indian, had applied for and received from the Attorney General of 
the United States, pursuant to§ 244(a)( I) of the I=igration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(a)(l) (1976), an exception from§ 242(b) of that Act, which would have mandated 
his deportation for having overstayed his noni=igrant student visa. The Attorney Gen-
eral's action had legal effect only if neither House of Congress voted a resolution of disap-
proval. Along with 339 other cases that were excepted from § 242(b), Chadha's case was 
reviewed by the House Committee on the Judiciary and was one of six found by the Com-
mittee (contrary to the Attorney General's opinion) not to have met the "statutory require-
ments, particularly as it relates to hardship." 121 CoNG. REC. 40800 (1975), quoted in 103 
S. Ct. at 2771. Accepting the Co=ittee's recommendation, the House passed the resolu-
tion of disapproval without a recorded vote. 
In Chadha, the legislative veto reversed an exception to the operation of the law; thus. 
as a direct consequence an injury befell Chadha, that is, he was ordered deported. Much 
more typically, a legislative veto prevents a governmental action, thus making it difficult to 
identify any individual who is directly injured. 
That the Court was intent on following the logic of Chadha to its limits was shown on 
July 6. 1983, when it su=arily affirmed two lower court decisions invalidating the legisla-
tive veto, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). One (Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers En-
ergy Council of America, No. 81-2008) struck down a requirement that the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Co=ission submit to legislative review any proposal for the decontrol of fuel; 
either house could "veto" the proposal. The other (U.S. St:nate v. FTC, No. 82-935) found 
unconstitutional the legislative veto provision of the Feder<>.! Trade Co=ission Improve-
ments Act, requiring the FTC to submit to legislative review any proposed "final rule." A 
concurrent resolution of disapproval was necessary to veto the proposal. 
As Justice White argued in his solitary dissent from these decisions (103 S. Ct. 3556, 
3557-58), distinctions could be drawn between these cases and Chadha as a) they involved 
independent regulatory agencies over which the president has little control, and b) the 
second case involved a two-House veto. 
2. Estimates vary, but the Justice Department, somewhat more conservatively than 
others, has reported that the Court's decision in effect overturned 207 legislative veto provi-
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be extraordinarily cogent, written with great care for precise char-
acterization of the veto as well as close analysis of its purpose and 
effect. Coming to the opinion with such an expectation, one is 
bound to be disappointed and must be left with a sense of wonder 
at the disproportion between the force of the reasoning and the 
extent of its consequences. I shall suggest, however, that these 
consequences can be justified, but only on a ground that the opin-
ion failed to articulate and that has major implications for admin-
istrative law----one that requires revitalization of the moribund 
nondelegation doctrine. 
I. THE CASE FOR THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
The legislative veto conditions a delegation of legislative au-
thority upon a later judgment by Congress3 on whether a rule or 
act implementing that delegation conforms to congressional in-
tent.4 Generally statutes containing a legislative veto provision re-
quire that the president or agency head submit to Congress rules 
or actions designed to implement that legislation; within a stated 
period-usually 30 or 60 days, though some are as short as 15 
days or as long as 120 dayss--Congress may either acquiesce in 
the proposal or vote a simple resolution of disapproval. Power to 
cast this "veto" is usually given to one or both branches of the 
legislature, though it has occasionally been vested in a single con-
gressional committee.6 If this vote on the resolution fails, or as is 
more common, Congress passively acquiesces in the administra-
tion's proposal, it becomes law. 
This method of qualifying legislative authority originated in 
the Executive Reorganization Act of 1932, permitting the presi-
dent to reorganize the Executive Branch subject to disapproval of 
sions in 126 different laws. N.Y. Times. July 2, 1983. at Al9. Because of different criteria, 
studies also vary on the number of laws the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional. 
Professor Abraham's careful study indicated 122 provisions of federal laws declared un-
constitutional as of the 1980 term. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUC-
TORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND fRANCE 305-10 
(4th ed. 1980). 
3. Legislative-veto provisions do not require adherence to the normal requirements 
of bicameral support and presentation to the president. as required by Art. I, § 7. 
4. Provisions exist calling for a congressional vote of approval before proposals or 
acts become lawful, and some (e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legisla-
tive Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 456 (1979)) have also called 
these requirements for affirmative approval "legislative vetoes." I will reserve the term 
"legislative veto" to affirmative acts that have the effect of negating proposals. 
5. Javits & Klein, supra note 4, at 456. The veto period in Chadha was extraordinar-
ily long, authorizing Congress to disapprove the recommendations of the Attorney General 
any time during the session in which they were submJtted to Congress or the next sessiOn. 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(c)(2). 
6. See J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 213-38 (1964). 
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his plans by either House of Congress within sixty days of its sub-
mission, 1 and for the rest of that decade, legislative veto provi-
sions were confined to legislation of this genre.8 In the next two 
decades use of the legislative veto spread, as Congress sought to 
maintain control over power that it had delegated to the president 
during World War II and the Cold War. During the sixties and 
seventies, the device became more common and its character 
changed. Its most popular use was to curb the "imperial" presi-
dent through tighter controls on his use of military force, 9 foreign 
aid, 10 and budgetary discretion.11 Of even greater significance, at 
least numerically, was its spread to control rule-making by admin-
istrative agencies;12 indeed, since the mid-seventies there have 
been several proposals to make the authority to exercise the legis-
lative veto a standard qualification to all administrative rule-
making.I3 
Although the legislative veto does not appear to fit the pris-
tine concept of separation of powers, a strong argument can be 
made that it does serve constitutional ends.l4 To start, it should 
be noted that the Constitution itself embodies an impure concep-
tion of the separation of powers and that this very impurity was 
designed to serve ends that the framers thought essential to good 
government: balance, energy, and accountability. In the name of 
balance, the system employs checks and balances to achieve an 
equilibrium making it unlikely that one branch of government 
7. Act of June 30. 1932. ch. 314. § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414. 
8. Brief histories of congressional use of the "veto" are found in Fisher, Introduc-
tion, in CONGRESSIONAl RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE 
LEGISLATIVE VETO 1-15 (L. Fisher ed.) (Comm. Print 1980) (hereinafter cited as STUDIES 
ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETo); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of 
Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REv. 253, 256-62 (1982); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A 
Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 983, 1002-29 (1975). 
Although Watson traces the legislative veto provisions to 1895, id. at 1003, I am following 
the conventional wisdom by starting with 1932. 
9. War Powers Resolution. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555,556-57 (1973) (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C. § 1544) (1976)). 
10. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-329, § 211,90 Stat. 729, 743 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(l) (Supp. V 1981)). 
II. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35 (codified at 2 U.S.C.S. § 684 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 
1983)). 
12. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(l) (Supp. V 1981) (education); 2 U.S.C. § 438(d)(2) 
(campaign financing) (Supp. V 1981); 49 U.S.C. § 1552(f)(3) (airline deregulation) (Supp. 
v 1981). 
13. E.g., H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNG. REc. 31,615-24, 31,668-69 
(1976). 
14. See, e.g., Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Constitutional Separation of Powers, 
in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAl ORDER 195-233 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis eds. 
1981). 
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could oppress the others or that any group, including a majority, 
could grasp the instruments of government to oppress the rest. In 
the name of energy, the president was given the leading role in 
foreign affairs-even when that involved the arguably legislative 
task of negotiating a treaty-and an influential role in the legisla-
tive process through his veto power and his obligation to recom-
mend to the legislature "measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient." Is And in the name of accountability, the framers con-
structed a deliberately impure and complex legislative process in-
volving both Houses of Congress and the executive. They sought 
to avoid a system overly responsive either to the potentially nar-
row and basely selfish "will of all" embodied in the legislature or 
to a "general will" which could too easily be confused in the exec-
utive's mind with his own vainglory. 
One of the most frequently acclaimed virtues of this scheme 
is its flexibility, its ability to generate or accept adaptations to situ-
ations whose precise nature the framers could not foresee. The 
legislative veto, some say,t6 is such an adaptation to such a 
situation. 
We are probably in greater need of being reminded that our 
contemporary situation resembles the framers' vision than that it 
differs, yet there is substantial truth in the cliche that the framers' 
Constitution has ushered into being a society of such interdepend-
ence and complexity that only dimly at best could they have fore-
seen its outline.t? It is a situation in which it is necessary for 
Congress to act, yet it is impossible for Congress to act with the 
sort of detailed legislation congressmen were accustomed to writ-
ing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The solution, of 
course, was to delegate legislative authority to the executive and to 
independent regulatory agencies-a course of action that was 
made more palatable by the ideas of "scientific management" and 
a neutral bureaucracy.ts 
This solution did serve the constitutional end of energy and 
efficiency, but, especially as it was realized that scientific manage-
ment and neutral bureaucracy were illusions, at the cost of ac-
countability and balance. In the late sixties and early seventies, 
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. 
\6. See, e.g., Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Execu-
tive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (\977); Javits & Klein, supra 
note 4. 
17. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note \6, at 328. 
\8. Fisher & Moe, Presidential Reorganization Authority: Is it Worth the Cost?, 96 
PoL. SCI. Q. 301 (1981). 
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we were told that the president had become "imperial,"l9 confus-
ing the general will with his personal image of glory, and more 
basely, with his own re-election. Even more distant from the ken 
of the framers was the rise of an entrenched bureaucracy with its 
own interests, its own visions of the good life, and with substantial 
authority to make law, for much of which it was accountable, real-
istically, neither to the Congress nor to the president. 
In this situation, Congress faced an apparent dilemma. It 
could continue to delegate, furthering energy and efficiency at the 
expense of balance and accountability, or it could maintain bal-
ance and accountability while sacrificing energy and efficiency to 
such an extent that areas demanding governance would remain 
ungoverned. Even if one believes that the scale of contemporary 
government could be trimmed dramatically, the contrast between 
the 350 bills typically enacted by Congress and the 7,000 rules and 
amended rules listed in the Federal Register in a single year2o sug-
gests that the dilemma is at least partly real. 
The legislative veto, it is argued, is a permissible constitu-
tional adaptation, enabling Congress to escape this unforeseeable 
dilemma.21 By delegating a qualified authority, Congress can 
maintain the system's energy, while by reserving authority to re-
view proposed rules and acts, it can restore balance and accounta-
bility.22 In short, the legislative veto is an attractive device, and 
far from violating the ends of the separation of powers, it appears 
to render those ends possible in a changed environment. 
The veto also survives more technical arguments concerning 
the means of separation of powers, including those of the majority 
in Chadha. The force of these arguments largely depends upon a 
characterization of the proposed rule or act that Congress reviews 
as "law." But the very terms of the legislative veto provisions state 
that the proposal or act does not have the status of law until after 
the period of time has elapsed during which Congress has the op-
portunity to review it. The majority's contrary characterization is 
therefore bafiling. It is said that the legislative veto interferes with 
the executive branch's authority to implement the law by uncon-
stitutionally restricting its choice of means, as well as its authority 
to determine the meaning of legislation, subject to later review by 
the courts. But if the proposal is not yet law, it can hardly be said 
19. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Miller & Knapp. 
The Congressional Veto: Preserving tire Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367. 377 
(1977). 
20. See Abourezk, supra note 16, at 323. 
21. See, e.g., Dry, supra note 14, at 228. 
22. /d. at 201-02. 
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that Congress is interfering with the executive's authority to im-
plement the law. Moreover, there can be no claim that the sub-
stance of the restrictions effected by the legislative veto encroaches 
upon some inherent executive prerogative,23 for there is no ques-
tion that Congress, if it had the time, could legislate with as much 
detail as is given through the 7,000 rules and amended rules writ-
ten annually by administrators. A more realistic criticism of the 
effect of the legislative veto is that it affronts the dignity of the 
executive branch by obliging it to develop rules, without any guar-
antee that these rules can be placed into effect.24 While accurate, 
this criticism does not rise to constitutional significance, for there 
is little reason to doubt that Congress has the authority, through 
the normal legislative process, to require executive bodies to sub-
mit proposals for the legislature to consider. 
Some critics say the legislative veto interferes with the presi-
dential authority to veto legislative proposals. The president does 
have authority to veto all legislative acts, with very few explicit2s 
23. Abourezk., supra note 16, at 328-30. The idea of executive prerogative, of course. 
more commonly refers to presidential authority that can be exercised independently of 
legislative action, such as presidential authority to remove executive officers, Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Legislative action restricting such a prerogative would 
be unconstitutional regardless of the form it took, whether that be ordinary legislation, a 
concurrent resolution, a two-thirds override of a presidential veto. or a legislative veto. 
Between presidential authority that is entirely dependent on legislation and authority 
that is entirely independent of legislative action lies what Justice Jackson called the "zone 
of twilight," Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952), where the 
President and Congress may have concurrent authority. It would be convenient to agree 
with Justice Black in his opinion of the Court in Youngstown that the zone simply does not 
exist, a position affirmed by Professor Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining 
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal 
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 102 ( 1976 ): either the President 
has a prerogative essential to his executive function or his authority depends entirely upon 
legislative authorization. But the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown. it 
must be admitted, has considerable force. 
Only a small minority oflegislative veto provisions can even arguably be placed in this 
zone (conceivably, e.g., the impoundment provision of the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. 1403, and the troop removal provision of the 
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 1544). But here the case against the legislative veto 
cannot be dismissed as casually as in the text above, because the veto attempts more than 
simply to prevent a proposed act from becoming law; it seeks to block presidential action 
that would be legitimate in the absence of congressional action. Because the veto here does 
have the purpose and effect of legislation, it would seem unconstitutional for failing to meet 
the requirements of bicameralism and presentation to the President; that is, in these unu-
sual instances, the legislative veto would be unconstitutional for the reasons articulated by 
Chief Justice Burger in Chadha. 
24. See Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a 
Leash?, 56 N.C.L. REv. 423 (1978). 
25. Authority to initiate impeachments (U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6); authority to 
conduct trial following impeachment (art. I, § 3, cl. 7); authority to approve or disapprove 
presidential appointments (art II, § 2, cl. 2); authority to ratify or refuse to ratify treaties 
negotiated by the president (art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
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and implicit26 exceptions, which would have the effect of law, and 
the framers were careful to ensure that legislative proposals could 
not slip by the executive authority merely by being called some-
thing other than a bill.27 But the legislative veto does not prevent 
anything from coming before the president that would have the 
effect of law or that would rescind law;2s it merely prevents what 
has the potential of law from achieving the actuality of law. Also, 
although no president can permanently yield to Congress the in-
herent authority of his office, it is not without significance that the 
law containing the authorization of the legislative veto was 
presented to him in accordance with the Constitution.29 
Another theory is that Congress improperly performs an es-
sentially judicial function in employing the legislative veto, since 
its object is to ensure that proposals conform to the intention of 
the law. Conceivably, the veto could be used in a manner that is 
essentially judicial, as when instead of determining what rules 
should be devised to implement a policy, Congress determines 
whether these rules apply in discrete circumstances. Justice Pow-
ell argues persuasively3o that this is what happened in Chadha, as 
Congress did attempt to determine whether the 340 aliens whose 
deportation orders were suspended by the Attorney General met 
"statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship."3I 
But in its characteristic use, reviewing rules that would have the 
effect of law unless vetoed by Congress, the legislative veto seems 
invulnerable to this charge. First, since what the legislature re-
views is not yet law, the review could displace the judicial func-
tion only if the judiciary had authority to render advisory 
opinions.32 Second, judicial review of administrative actions is 
supposed to follow the rule of the "clear mistake,"33 that is, law is 
to be declared void only if the administrative agency has clearly 
26. These relate to powers incidental to the effective performance of the legislative 
function, such as authority to investigate, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 ( 1927), or to 
cite and punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt of Congress, Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). 
27. U.S. CoNST. art. I. § 7, cl. 3. 
28. A possible exception arises when a concurrent resolution is deemed sufficient to 
halt an ongoing policy. See. e.g .• Lease-Lend Act, Act of Mar. II, 1941, ch. II.§ 3(c), 55 
Stat. 31-32 (codified before expiration at 22 U.S.C. § 412); Jackson, A Presidential Legal 
Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953). 
29. See, e.g., Dry. supra note 14, at 209. 
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
31. See supra note I. 
32. See. e.g .• Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp .. 333 U.S. 103 
( 1948); Haybum's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
33. See, e.g .• NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc .. 322 U.S. Ill (1944); Monaghan, 
Marburv and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. I (1983). 
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erred in its interpretation of the statute. Congressional review 
does not duplicate or displace this function, as Congress examines 
whether the proposal does conform to the actual intent. Third, 
although some commentators call for a different approach,34 it re-
mains the prevailing rule that the courts should refer to the con-
gressional intent when the legislation was passed,3s not to what 
that Congress would do if it were in session today or what the 
current Congress would do if it were to consider the legislation. 
As Senator Javits has emphasized, a distinguishing feature of the 
legislative veto is that it permits Congress to review administrative 
proposals "in accordance with a dynamic political intent based on 
Congress's current interpretation of the public interest," ensuring 
that legislation does "meet the test of current public interest as de-
termined by Congress."36 
Some contend that the legislative veto is itself a legislative 
act, having the purpose and effect of amending or rescinding prior 
legislation, but not following the established legislative route of 
bicameral support and presentation to the executive. This is the 
central point of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in 
Chadha. The basis for this characterization of the veto should be 
scrutinized carefully since it undergirds the claims of encroach-
ment on executive and judicial authority. The Chief Justice ar-
gues that the one-House veto "had the purpose and effect of 
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including 
the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all 
outside the legislative branch."37 But in what sense can there have 
been rights and duties prior to the legislative veto? Only after the 
expiration of the congressional review period were the Attorney 
General's proposals to have vested rights in Chadha and duties in 
governmental officials.3s A.1d if there were no rights and duties 
antecedent to the legislative veto, the court cannot logically argue 
that the legislative veto altered them. 
The Chief Justice reiterates his characterization of the legisla-
tive veto as having the purpose and effect of full-fledged legisla-
tion by arguing that absent the iegislative veto provision, neither 
House of Congress nor both of them acting together "could effec-
tively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the 
Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated author-
34. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
35. The classic statement is found in E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASON-
ING 27-57 (1949). 
36. Javits & Klein, supra note 4, at 473 (emphasis added). 
37. \03 S. Ct. at 2784. 
38. See Immigration and Nationality Act§ 244(c)(2). 
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ity, had determined the alien should remain in the United States. 
Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this could have 
been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deporta-
tion. "39 The short answer to this statement is that Congress did 
not fully delegate authority to the Attorney General; it reserved 
control over that authority by the inclusion of the legislative veto 
provision. 
Possible insight is given into the source of the Court's confu-
sion by the following section of the opinion: 
Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the At-
torney General to deport an individual alien whose deportation otherwise would 
be cancelled under § 244. The one-House veto operated in this case to overrule 
the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House ac-
tion, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its 
action has altered Chadha's status.40 
There is a crucial ambiguity in the term "otherwise." It could 
mean that Congress interfered, through the one-House veto, with 
established rights or duties; that is, if Congress had not interfered, 
the rights would still remain vested. Or the term can mean simply 
that the choice is dichotomous: either Congress vetoes the provi-
sion or it does not; that is, if Congress had not acted, rights and 
duties would have become vested. The first meaning forms the 
premise of the Court's argument, and it may well be the more 
common understanding of "otherwise," but the second correctly 
states the process of the legislative veto: Congress can veto the 
provision, "otherwise" it becomes law. Speculation on unarticu-
lated steps of the Court's reasoning, of course, especially when one 
considers the dynamics of group reasoning,4 1 is an uncertain en-
terprise, but it seems that the Court first recognized that the 
"otherwise" characterization of the legislative veto included an ac-
curate description of the nature of the legislative veto and then 
moved unconsciously from the accurate to the common but inac-
curate understanding of the term. 
This explanation of the Court's reasoning may not be plausi-
ble, but what are the other possibilities? One possibility concerns 
the issue whether the provision authorizing the legislative veto 
could be severed from the rest of the statute. The Court gave close 
attention42 to this question before it came to the merits of the leg-
islative veto. Having concluded that the rest of the statute could 
be fully operable without the legislative veto provision and that it 
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 (footnotes omitted). 
40. /d. at 2784-85 (emphasis added). 
41. See, e.g., W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 37-90 (1964). 
42. See 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76. 
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was the intention of Congress for the rest of the statute to stand if 
the legislative veto provision was found unconstitutional, the 
Court perhaps regarded the statute as having the legislative veto 
already severed from it, in which case the Attorney General's de-
cision would have the status of law rather than a mere proposal. 
Of course there is no reason to sever the provision unless it is 
unconstitutional, but if we assume that it is then the Court's con-
clusion flows smoothly. If the legislative veto is severable and un-
constitutional, then the Attorney General's proposal surely is law. 
And if the proposal is law, there can be no doubt that the legisla-
tive veto effected a rescission or alteration of the law without 
meeting the requirements of bicameralism and presentation! This 
line of reasoning cannot be accused of merely begging the ques-
tion-it also employs its answer. 43 
In short, an attractive case can be made that the legislative 
veto furthers rather than thwarts constitutional ends and does not 
violate constitutional means-at least as these are commonly ar-
ticulated44 and were articulated by the Supreme Court. 
II. THE CASE AGAINST THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
A central though not always express premise of the case for 
the legislative veto is that it only allows Congress to achieve the 
same sort of results that it would achieve if it had the time and 
energy to write and approve the thousands of rules and acts done 
each year by the administration in the implementation of the 
law.4s Reviewing is not quite the same as writing and not all pro-
posals can receive a close review (although the mere threat of the 
veto is likely, it is said, to keep the administration close to the 
/ intent behind the statute), so the results will be somewhat different 
than if Congress itself legislated in detail, but the difference, ac-
cording to this theory, is insubstantial. 
How sound is this justification? To illustrate the difference 
between the legislative process with and without the legislative 
veto, we should first take a simple though abstract example-the 
43. Where the provision for the legislative veto was insened into pre-existing legisla-
tion, as when the Congress sought greater control of the Federal Trade Commission (Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 2l(a), 94 Stat. 
374,393 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l) (Supp. V 1981)), the Coun's argument has greater 
plausibility, but no greater reality. When the Congress enacts such a provision it substan-
tially changes the legal authority of the agency so that no proposal should be considered 
law until the specified period of time passes without a legislative veto. 
44. More effective criticisms have been offered by Manin, supra note 8, and Watson, 
supra note 8. 
45. See, e.g .. Abourezk, supra note 16, at 328-30. 
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legislative package. Commonly, legislation will be a compromise 
whose components have varying sorts and levels of support.46 Let 
us assume that there are several components, each of which is op-
posed, though not vigorously, by a bare majority. In this situa-
tion, the legislature might a) oppose the package as a whole (likely 
if the opposition majorities coincide), b) support the package as a 
whole (likely if the opposition majorities do not coincide closely 
and if the sentiment for provisions is more intense than the senti-
ment against), or c) support the package, if legislators know that 
later they will have the opportunity to block implementation of 
the offending provision through the legislative veto. The legisla-
tive veto would make no difference under the first possibility, but 
would introduce telling differences under the last two possibilities. 
If the package as a whole enjoys unconditional majority support 
in the legislature (b), it will pass with or without the legislative 
veto. In the implementation stage, however, without the legisla-
tive veto, each component will be implemented, but with the legis-
lative veto, no component will be implemented. If the package as 
a whole enjoys conditional support (c), then the bill would not 
pass without the legislative veto but would pass with it. Although 
the bill would pass with the legislative veto, at the implementation 
stage, the result is the same as if it had failed to pass, for no com-
ponent would be implemented. There is, however, an important 
difference: with the legislative veto, Congress has signaled to the 
public that it has taken action on a problem; without the veto, no 
such pretense exists. 
This example employs some unrealistic assumptions-for in-
stance, that the legislation enjoys a high level of visibility from the 
time of passage through its implementation, that the options for 
implementing each component were apparent from the start and 
brought forward without appreciable deviation by the administra-
tion, and that the preferences of the legislators remained constant 
both in numbers and intensity. And the hypothetical structures of 
support and opposition are not the most common ones. Neverthe-
less, it seems safe to conclude that the legislative veto makes legis-
lation easier to pass, but harder to implement-at least in 
accordance with the intention implied by the terms of the bill. 
As we introduce more realistic assumptions, these conclu-
sions are rendered no less sound, but certainly more complex. 
First, the administrative agency, interested in having its proposals 
46. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION; PUBLIC GooDS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43 n. 64, 121 (1965); A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERN-
MENT 370-71 (1967). 
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survive the threat of a legislative veto, is likely to work in concert 
with Congress early in the development of any proposal.47 Sec-
ond, since visibility and interest in the legislation will be lower at 
the stage of implementation, and since a division of labor within 
Congress must take place if it is to be effective in its control of the 
administration, the most consequential work will be performed in 
the committees and subcommittees.4s Third, since a major, if not 
the major, incentive for congressmen in the selection of commit-
tees and subcommittees is the benefits that the position will allow 
them to bring to their constituencies,49 the congressmen most in-
volved with the development and review of the proposals will 
have disproportionately more than other congressmen to gain or 
lose. Thus a likely and apparently common occurrence is a signif-
icant skewing of the original legislative intent towards the inter-
ests of the congressmen on the overseeing committee or 
subcommittee and the groups and people most responsible for 
their re-electicn.so 
Except in the minority of cases where the committee itself 
exercises the veto,si the committee's threat to veto, of course, has 
force only to the extent that there is good chance that the rest of 
the House or Senate will support its decision. There is no guaran-
tee of this, but given the limited time available to Congress and its 
customary pattern of deference to its committees, the probability 
is high enough to warrant the serious concern of an administrative 
agency desirous of having its proposals become law and of avoid-
ing adverse publicity. Less commonly noted, but in some ways 
more consequential than the threat of the legislative veto, is the 
promise of committee acquiescence. Its recommendation to veto 
is ultimately dependent upon the will of its parent body, but as 
Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn point out in their landmark 
study, "Whenever [the oversight committee] does not report a veto 
resolution to the floor of a house, the committee, with its narrow 
47. See, e.g., Davis, Legislative Vetoes in Energy Policy, in STUDIES ON THE LEGISLA-
TIVE VETO, supra note 8, at 107, 112. An administrative agency might attempt to develop 
proposals, in accord with the original legislative intent, entirely aloof from the subcommit-
tee overseeing it. but impasse between the agency and the subcommittee is then likely. See 
Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legisla-
tive Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1379 (1977). 
48. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE 
66 (1979); Bruff & Gellhom, supra note 47, at 1381-82. 
49. SeeM. fiORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTABLISHMENT 
62-67 (1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 85-97 (1974). 
50. See Holliday, Export Administration Act: Legislative Veto Provisions, in STUDIES 
ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra note 8, at 321, 324. 
51. Eg., Post Office Department Appropriations Act, 1971. See also J. HARRIS, supra 
note 6, at 217-38. 
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constituency, wields all of Congress' review power."s2 Their em-
pirical study confirms our logical deductions: "the chief effect of 
the veto power seems to be an increase in the power of congrei>-
sional committees and in the practice of negotiating over the sub-
stance of rules."s3 
The policy process that I describe here, where law is in effect 
made by an administrative agency, a committee or subcommittee, 
and the narrow constituency most directly affected by the legisla-
tion and best organized to respond to it, is of course the commonly 
noted iron triangle, or government by subsystem.s4 This develop-
ment preceded the proliferation of the legislative veto provisions, 
some descriptions of its operation do not even make reference to 
the legislative veto,ss and congressional committees do have other 
tools for influencing administrative agencies towards their partial 
concerns. Nevertheless, those who have studied these triangular 
relations indicate that among the tools available to committees 
and subcommittees, the power to acquiesce or recommend a veto 
resolution is probably the most effective.s6 In short, we seem fully 
warranted in our conclusion that the veto facilitates a significant 
distortion of the purpose of the law. 
Another effect of the veto is to make administrative agencies 
more responsive to the changing moods of Congress.s7 As men-
tioned above, the traditional rule is that administrative agencies 
and courts should interpret and implement legislation in accord-
ance with the intention of the legislature that did in fact pass ips 
Some advocate a different approach. Guido Calabresi, for exam-
ple, argues for a "common law" approach to the interpretation of 
statutes whereby courts would adjust the meaning of statutes to 
bring them into accord with the rest of the "legal topography"-
the accumulation of other statutes, constitutional decisions, and 
administrative regulations.s9 The Supreme Court has affirmed 
such an approach taken by the Internal Revenue Service in its 
decision to withhold tax-exempt status from private schools that 
52. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47, at 1418 (emphasis added). See also Grimmet, 
The Legislative Veto and US. Arms Sales, in STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO, supra 
note 8, at 249, 255-59. 
53. Bruff & Gellhorn. supra note 47, at 1420. 
54. See, e.g., L. DODD & R. ScHOTT, CoNGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
95-104 (1979). 
55. See, e.g., T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979). 
56. See, e.g.. R. ARNOLD, supra note 48, at 66; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47; 
Miller & Knapp, supra note 19, at 376; L. DoDD & R. ScHoTT. supra note 54, at 229-35. 
57. Martin, supra note 8, at 278-79. 
58. See, e.g., E. LEVI, supra note 35, at 27-57. 
59. G. CALABRESI. supra note 34. 
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discriminate on the basis of race. Whatever the merits of this ap-
proach,60 not even its staunchest advocates contend that adminis-
trative agencies should settle for anything less than well-
supported, clearly stated, and enduring signals of a changed legis-
lative intent. 
What the legislative veto encourages, however, is responsive-
ness to a changed legislative intent that may be prompted by noth-
ing more profound than a momentary shift in the mood of the 
public, the proximity to an election, an altered composition of the 
overseeing committee, the rise of a new and committed interest 
group-a change of intent that would not be sufficient to stir the 
passage of a law, but that would be adequate to affect administra-
tive rules under the threat of a legislative veto.6I 
Finally we should note the shift that the veto introduces in a 
congressman's perspective about passing and implementing legis-
lation. Without the veto, those who are intent upon achieving the 
passage of legislation must think, and even educate their constitu-
encies to think, in terms of the art of the possible. They must be 
willing to accept compromises, accommodate divergent interests, 
make trade-offs. The price of being excessively idealistic or overly 
committed to an interest is ineffectiveness; and the congressman 
must take the blame for that consequence. But knowing that they 
will have the opportunity to protect themselves and their constitu-
encies through the veto, congressmen are more likely to legislate 
at a highly abstract and general level where compromises need not 
be made and trade-offs need not be faced.62 
Equally important to this expanded incentive and opportu-
nity for avoiding trade-offs in the passage of legislation is what 
David Martin has called "the luxury of being negative"63 in the 
implementation of the law. That is, by placing the primary bur-
den on the administrative agencies to put forward proposals, con-
gressmen are free simply to point out what is wrong with any 
given proposal rather than weighing the costs and benefits of this 
proposal against other possibilities.64 This of course is not to say 
60. See, e.g., Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt Schools Debate, PuB. INTEREST. Sum-
mer 1982, at 21. 
61. See L. Fl~HER, THE POLITICS Of SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECU-
TIVE 99 (1981). 
62. See, e.g., Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Overload. 
REG., Nov./Dec. 1979, at 19, 25. According to Louis Fisher "Congress delegates far 
greater power with the legislative veto than it would without it." L. FISHER, supra note 61. 
at 101. 
63. Martin, supr.; note 8, at 267-74. 
64. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST; A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
131-34 (1980). 
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that congressmen invariably succumb to this temptation, but 
whenever a tough trade-off appears, the veto permits them to de-
clare themselves in favor of virtue and blame the administrative 
agency for bringing forward its blemished proposal. 
In sum, compared to the normal legislative process, the pro-
cess with the veto eases the passage of laws, especially vague and 
abstract ones, makes it more difficult to implement them in ac-
cordance with the original legislative intent (to the extent that it 
can be determined), skews the operation of the law in favor of 
narrow constituencies, makes the administration sensitive to eva-
nescent moods of Congress, and encourages unrealistic moral pos-
turing by congressmen. 
In light of this comparison, we should re-examine how well 
the legislative veto serves the ends of balance, energy, and ac-
countability. Energy, or efficiency, is perhaps more properly spo-
ken of as an end that the legislative veto preserves rather than 
promotes. That is, the veto is designed to maintain the efficiency 
of delegation of authority while permitting Congress to regain 
control. It must be doubted, however, that that control has been 
or really can be regained without some sacrifice of efficiency. If 
the administrative agency develops its proposal in isolation from 
Congress, there is serious danger of prompting a legislative veto 
and coming to an impasse.6s On the other hand if the agency 
works closely with the committee or subcommittee (or its stafi), 
the process of negotiating rules must slow, to some extent, the de-
velopment of proposals.66 Even if there is some loss of efficiency, 
however, this would seem to be a small expense, if the gain were a 
recovering of accountability and balance. But these ends are pro-
moted only if they are understood in a debased sense. 
Instead of promoting the idea of accountability to the will of 
the people in the constitutional sense discussed above, one that 
combines the virtues of the will of all and the general will, the 
legislative veto fosters accountability to slender sectors of the elec-
torate and to ephemeral moods. Madison spoke of the legislative 
process as one in which representatives would "refine and en-
large" raw and narrow interests present in their constituencies.67 
The normal process does tend to do this by forcing compromise 
and accommodation.6s But the legislative veto encourages the 
congressman, by virtue of the electoral advantage it affords, to ca-
65. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 47, at 1410-12, 1426, 1432-33. 
66. /d. at 1414-17. 
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
68. /d. 
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ter to the interests as they are given to him. And while Hamilton 
affirmed "[t]he republican principle . . . that the deliberate sense 
of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom 
they intrust the management of their affairs," he also emphasized 
that this "does not require an unqualified complaisance to every 
sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the 
people may receive .... "69 
While the legislative veto may bring about a sort of restora-
tion of the equilibrium between the President and Congress,1o it is 
primarily through a power in Congress rather than a power of 
Congress. That is, it gives power to subcommittees and individual 
congressmen, especially in enhancing their electoral possibilities. 
But only in rare instances can it be said to bring about a balance 
between Congress as a body and the administration. 
Balance, accountability, and energy are intermediate ends, 
each serving in large part the higher end of liberty.?' Energy in 
the government was deemed necessary to protect liberty from so-
cial disorder and foreign nations,n balance and accountability to 
protect liberty from the government itself. n 
The liberty protected by the Constitution has several levels 
and many aspects. Most commonly one thinks of rights specifi-
cally enumerated in the Constitution. But liberal democracies 
generally and the American polity in particular respect a general 
right to "natural" liberty deriving from the contract theories of the 
state.74 As a threshold condition for the circumscription of this 
liberty by the federal government, the Constitution mandates, ex-
cept implicitly for emergency situations,1s that there be a certain 
level of agreement and commitment as these are formally indi-
cated by the legislative requirements of bicameral support and 
presentation to the president. This principle respects individuals 
both in their capacity as subject and as citizen. It recognizes that 
as a subject of the state the individual does legitimately fear gov-
ernmental abuse, doubt the scope of governmental competence, 
and deserve assurance that his liberty will not be casually circum-
scribed. The principle also recognizes that as a citizen of the state, 
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
70. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 16; Dry, supra note 14; Javits & Klein, supra 
note 4. 
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison). 
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (A. Hamilton). 
73. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison). 
74. See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *123; J. ELY, supra note 64, at 134; 
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT§ 22 (1690). But seeR. DwoR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266-78 ( 1977). 
75. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 19, at 7-10. 
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the individual participates in the selection of those people upon 
whose authority alone76 this natural liberty is to be limited. And 
this authority to circumscribe liberty through law also implies the 
authority to maintain that law unless it is displaced or altered by 
an equally authoritative act. 
I have used the term "agreement" to emphasize that the for-
mal requirements of legislation cannot be merely formal, but that 
the framers did expect a meeting of minds as to the proper course 
of action-not necessarily as to motives, but as to intent.?7 With-
out this substantive expectation the formal requirements would be 
without consequence.7s If "agreement" amounted to nothing 
more than the identification of a difficult and politically charged 
problem that the legislature would like someone else to handle-
to decide the questions of who will be burdened and who will be 
benefited, to make the trade-o.ffs, to prescribe the actual rules of 
conduct-then the carefully constructed procedures for rendering 
the legislative process accountable to a complex notion of the will 
of the people would be worthless. The process would protect 
neither the individual's liberty as a subject of the state nor his au-
thority as a citizen of the state.79 The Constitution must envision 
that there will be a discernable content to legislation,so an "intelli-
gible principle"si to guide the administration of the law. 
While "agreement" is a dimension emphasized by virtually 
all writers who have dealt seriously with constitutional limits to 
delegation, the constitutional concern for a level of commitment 
behind legislation is less commonly noted. The framers hoped to 
ensure that legislation would have behind it a level of commit-
ment strong enough to be constant in abiding by the terms of the 
agreement. Liberty was not to be circumscribed and released, 
courses of conduct mandated then altered, burdens imposed then 
76. See, e.g., 1. LOCKE, supra note 74, at § 141. 
77. On the legitimacy and importance of the distinction between intent and motives. 
see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH; THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
PoLITICS 208-220 ( 1962). But see Ely. Legislative and Administrative Motivall?n In Conslitu-
lional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-22 (1970). 
78. This seems to have been the ground of Locke's concern, supra note 74. 
79. Arguably, citizenship is not affronted when elected lawmakers choose to delegate 
their tasks to others, as the lawmakers remain ultimately accountable to the people. The 
point would be valid if citizenship were a matter of democratic sovereignty, for complete 
sovereignty should logically entail the capacity to alienate authority. But if qualified sover-
eignty itself arises from an understanding of citizenship that rests upon individual dignity 
and individual duty and which vests those qualities in the elected representatives of the 
people, then there is indeed an affront to citizenship in the delegation of essential authority. 
For the delegation itself violates the qualities of dignity and duty. · 
80. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (1958). 
81. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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lifted according to blips of approval and disapproval in "perpetual 
vibration."82 Law was not to be the product, in Burke's phrase, of 
a "momentary aggregation," but to emerge from a partnership 
"between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who 
are to be born." Repeatedly, throughout the Federalist, one finds 
a constitutional commitment to commitment, a concern that a 
course not be embarked upon unless it is with a seriousness to see 
it through. This concern with a community through time as well 
as space is seen in the staggered scheme of representation, with 
members chosen from three distinct periods over the last six years, 
and in the relatively lengthy terms of office for senators8J and the 
president. 84 These people, by virtue of their terms of office could 
have both the incentive and the capacity to follow through on a 
course of action. Indeed some of the most forceful and critical 
language in the Federalist papers is directed towards the "mis-
chiefs of . . . inconstancy and mutability in the laws." These, 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 73, "form the greatest blemish in 
the character and genius of our governments."ss Madison tells us 
that "the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a 
volume." Assuming that there was more than adequate experi-
ence with the problem, Madison chose to "hint a few only, each of 
which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable others." 
Two of these are of special relevance here. First, a mutable policy 
"poisons the blessings of liberty itself," by making the laws "so 
incoherent that they cannot be understood." "Law," he writes, "is 
defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is 
little known, and less fixed?"86 "[T]he most deplorable effect of 
all," however, is this: 
[T)hat diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the 
people towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and 
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an 
individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable, nor be truly 
respectable without possessing a certain portion of order and stability. 87 
Madison only "hints" the flow of reasoning, but it follows from 
this that a government that is wanting in respectability is wanting 
in authority. This argument does not imply that one has a right of 
civil disobedience against any law that is passed without the req-
uisite level of commitment, but it certainly implies that a process 
82. THE FEDERALIST No.9, at 71 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
83. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62 & 63 (J. Madison). 
84. See THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (A. Hamilton). 
85. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 444 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 380-81 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
87. /d. at 382. 
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of law differing from that clearly established by the Constitution 
which lowers the level of commitment likely to accompany law is 
a process that should be viewed with suspicion. 
When Congress includes a veto provision in legislation, it is 
actually withholding its legislative authority.ss The completion of 
this authority occurs when Congress acquiesces in an administra-
tive proposal, putatively designed to implement the original legis-
lative act. Some commentators have spoken of this as a 
delegation of authority from Congress to itself,s9 or to a portion of 
itself. But since the legislative authority never fully leaves Con-
gress until the moment of acquiescence, it seems more accurate to 
refer to the initial act of including the legislative veto, not as a 
delegation of authority but as a reservation of authority.9o 
Advocates of the veto have spoken of this acquiescence as a 
"condition precedent" to legal effect.9I And indeed there are nu- 1----· 
merous examples of legislative authority being "conditioned" 
upon the occurrence of an event.92 The favored example is Currin 
v. Wallace, 93 where federal market controls on tobacco farming 
were to go into effect only if two-thirds of the growers in the af-
fected districts voted in favor of having the regulations apply. If 
approval by tobacco farmers is an acceptable condition precedent 
to legal effect, then surely the approval of Congress should be. 
But legislative acquiescence is distinct from other conditions 
precedent to legal effect in the very important sense that in all 
other cases the will of the Congress is complete.94 When Congress 
88. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 16, at 338. 
89. See, e.g .. Henry. The Legis/alive Ve1o: In Search of Cons1i1u1ional Limils, 16 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735, 753 (1979). 
90. On the basis of this characterization, Edward S. Corwin gave the legislative veto 
the benefit of his prestige. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 
at 130 (4th ed. 1957); see also Cooper & Cooper, The Legis/alive Velo and 1he Conslilulion, 
30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 467 (1962); and Abourezk, supra note 16. 
91. See Abourezk, supra note 16, at 327, 337; Cooper & Cooper, supra note 90, at 
473-74; E. CoRWIN, supra note 90, at 130; Dry. supra note 14, at 205, 209. 
92. Such as authorization of a schedule of duties on imported goods being condi-
tioned upon "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties laid on American goods by 
foreign governments. C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION !54 (3rd ed. !977). 
93. 306 U.S. I (1939). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944); 
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 
(1892). 
94. The Currin opinion itself implied an understanding of this distinction, by empha-
sizing the nonlegislative character of the farmers' vote: "While in a sense one may say that 
such residents are exercising legislative power, it is not an exact statement, because the 
power has already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under 
the Constitution .... " 306 U.S. I, 16 (1939). 
Others have pointed to the distinctive character of making congressional action or 
inaction a "condition precedent" to legal effect, but have criticized it for reasons other than 
that given here. J. HARRIS, supra note 6. at 241, contends that making the "condition 
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enacts a law with a legislative veto its will is incomplete. It is 
saying in effect "we will that proposals issued under the heading 
of this bill become law if at a later time we will that they become 
law." On a given bill or a given proposal there may be present 
through these two expressions of will the level of agreement and 
commitment that the Constitution holds as a minimal condition 
for the authoritative charting of human conduct; but the logic and 
evidence of congressional action indicate that frequently that is 
not the case. 
Exactly because there is the chance for a second look, for ar-
resting the implementation of the provision one most dislikes, for 
checking an implication that one did not initially take time to con-
sider, for pressing the bureaucracy for an implementation most 
favorable to one's interest-for these reasons and others it takes 
less agreement and commitment for a proposal to gain the support 
of both houses.9s And further, as indicated in the above analysis, 
the second expression of support is mere acquiescence,96 it is given 
only on an aspect rather than the whole of the legislation, it is 
probably given by a Congress of different composition and inter-
ests than the one that approved the initial act, and it is likely to be 
effectively granted by a committee or subcommittee rather than 
the whole of Congress.97 What would have prompted a veto of 
precedent" to legal effect an action or inaction of Congress injects the legislative will into 
the sphere of executive authority. permitting it to "set aside or to reverse executive deci· 
sions'' in a manner other than that authorized by the Constitution-that is, the normal 
legislative process. The flaw with this analysis is the assumption that the legislative veto 
voids something already having the status of law. 
David Martin's analysis, supra note 8, is based less on formal interference with the 
executive authority than on functional pathologies. His argument is that when the condi-
tion precedent to legal effect is congressional approval, the legislature involves itself so 
deeply in implementation of the law that it develops a vested interest and thus renders itself 
less competent to assess the workings of the law--something that does not occur if the 
condition is an event or the expression of will apart from congressional assent. While this 
analysis invokes a more accurate characterization of the legislative veto. it misses the es-
sence of the problem. First, whenever Congress enacts law, it is identified with the conse-
quence; involvement with the so-called (but not formally accurate) implementation might 
increase the identification. but so would the writing of more specific legislation. And surely 
legislation that is vague cannot be constitutionally preferred to legislation that is explicit. 
Second. this criticism seems at odds with the rest of Martin's analysis, which stresses that 
legislative vetoes allow congressmen to distance their initial legislative acts from later ad-
ministrative proposals. 
95. See, e.g., L. FISHER, supra note 61, at 101. 
96. Silence may be golden in some spheres, but it has never counted for much in 
legislative interpretation. See E. LEVI, supra note 35. at 27-57. And when the Court has 
attended to the supposed will of a Congress that is "silently vocal," bizarre consequences 
have sometimes ensued. See Powell, The Sri// Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, m 3 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 931 ( 1938). 
97. See, e.g .. Fisher & Moe. supra note 18, at 316; Bruff & Gellhom. supra note 47, at 
1417-20. 
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the first body may slide past the second, even though it would not 
have had sufficient support to pass as law.9s And what not only 
would have gained the acquiescence of the initial body, but its 
affirmative approval, may now be vetoed.99 There will thus be 
instances where a proposal should have become law, having suffi-
cient agreement and commitment-at least as a part of a larger 
package or a means to an articulated end in the initial legislative 
act-but instead was blocked. In such cases the proposal's sup-
porters were cheated of an action to which they were entitled, and 
the authority of the individual as citizen was diminished. But the 
even more serious problem is in legislative acquiescence. Too 
often liberty will be circumscribed, courses of conduct will be au-
thoritatively charted, benefits and burdens will be distributed 
without the level of support that is the norm under the legislative 
process without the legislative veto. 
We deal, of course, with probabilities. There is no absolute 
guarantee that legislation passed under the normal legislative pro-
cess will have behind it more agreement and commitment than 
legislation passed through a process that includes the legislative 
veto. But if anything is clear from the structure of the Constitu-
tion it is that the legislative process is designed so that there will 
be a strong probability that the law will have a high degree of 
agreement and commitment behind it. It is also clear that the leg-
islative process with the legislative veto lowers that threshold re-
quirement of agreement and commitment. 
Ill. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
If there was a single common ground between the majority 
opinion and Justice White's elaborate dissent in Chadha, it was 
that Congress had authority to delegate vast authority. The ma-
jority reasoned that Congress may delegate authority, but "must 
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legisla-
tively altered or revoked."1oo Justice White argued that since 
Congress could delegate authority (court-enforced restrictions 
having disappeared-in his mind appropriately soioi), "it is most 
98. A possible example is the use of racial quotas in the absence of proven legal or 
constitutional violations. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
219-55 (1979) (Rehnquist. J., dissenting). 
99. Legislative vetoes have the same objectionable effect on the president's veto 
power. When a bill contains a legislative veto provision, the president cannot fully evalu-
ate the measure because its contents cannot be fully known; they are a mere prediction of 
what Congress will choose to do. 
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2786. 
101. See id. at 2801-02 (White, J., dissenting). 
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difficult to understand Article I as forbidding Congress from also 
reserving a check on legislative power for itself."w2 Further, he 
wrote: 
If the effective functioning of a complex modern government requires the delega-
tion of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or "quasi-legis-
lative" in character, I cannot accept that Article !-which is, after all, the source 
of the non-delegation doctrine~hould forbid Congress from qualifying that 
grant with a legislative veto.l03 
White's reasoning seems to have linked the concepts cor-
rectly. If Congress can delegate, it can veto. If Congress can dele-
gate "vast authority," then my analysis, while correctly identifying 
the fault with the legislative veto, must be said to make too much 
of it. The analysis is concerned with the mere formalities of legis-
lation. While these formalities in the Constitution and republican 
government may once have respected a general right to liberty in 
the way I have maintained, they no longer do; that respect is no 
longer practicable for the "effective functioning of a complex 
modem government." If Congress can delegate vast, vague, and 
essentially standardless authority to the administrative agencies, 
identifying only the problem to be solved,104 leaving it up to the 
administrative agency to determine the sort of liberty that should 
be circumscribed and the course of human conduct that should be 
charted, then it is idle to speak of the legislative process maintain-
ing certain standards of agreement and commitment. It would be 
anomalous to insist upon the unconstitutionality of the legislative 
veto and to let pass "vast" delegations of legislative authority. If 
the above analysis is correct, however, then the Court's result in 
Chadha should render suspect such delegation. 
Even though the nondelegation doctrine and what might be 
called the nonreservation doctrine respect the same underlying 
right to liberty, courts will have to approach the two doctrines dif-
ferently, for the simple reason that a reservation of authority is 
easy to identify, while an excessive delegation of authority is not. 
In resurrecting the nondelegation doctrine then, courts will have 
to proceed cautiously on a case by case basis, rather than with a 
single dramatic decision as for the legislative veto. 
Nevertheless, the theory proposed in this article does suggest 
the appropriate starting point: the idea of an "intelligible princi-
ple." los If government must respect a general right to liberty, so 
102. !d. at 2802. 
103. !d. at 2804. 
104. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 2.05 (1958). 
105. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
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that only upon a certain level of agreement and commitment can 
it abridge that liberty, there must be something intelligible to 
which the representatives are agreeing. The idea of an intelligible 
principle also finds support in the idea that the duty of Congress is 
to "make law." If law is to be, as Madison wrote, a "rule of ac-
tion," 106 then it must have an intelligible principle. No doubt it is 
too simplistic today to insist that the legislature's province is to 
make law and not to make lawmakers.I07 To provide adequate 
guidance to citizens about what is lawful and what is not, to adapt 
a principle to varied and rapidly changing environments, to dis-
cover and assess the facts that are conditions for the implementa-
tion of legislation-all of this requires legislators created by 
Congress whom we call civil servants or executive officers. But at 
the same time that Congress creates lawmakers, it is not too much 
to ask that it also make law, that is, to require that Congress sup-
ply "rules of conduct," or "intelligible principles," to direct their 
lawmaking. 
The idea of a conditional general right to liberty also suggests 
a better route to the revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine 
than others that have been articulated in recent years. While per-
haps the most powerful recent argument in favor of a revitalized 
rule of nondelegation is based ultimately on a concept of duty, 1os 
it seems preferable in a liberal democracy to seek ultimate 
groundings in individual rights, from which, of course, duties 
should be inferred. The idea of a general right to liberty subject to 
abridgment upon a certain level of agreement and commitment 
does this. 
This right seems a more plausible ground for supporting the 
nondelegation doctrine than other justifications based on individ-
ual rights which have been brought forward in recent years. Ar-
guments have been constructed from a right to due processl09 and 
equal protection,110 but it seems possible to meet these concerns 
completely without limiting Congress's authority to delegate au-
thority. All that is necessary is that the administrative agency de-
velop clear enough rules to give fair notice about what is lawful 
106. THE fEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 86, at 381. 
107. See J. LOCKE, supra note 74, at § 141. 
108. See S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER 36-51 ( 1975 ). 
109. See Cushman. The Consuturional Srarus of rhe /ndependenr Regu/arory Commis-
sions, 24 CORNELL l.Q. 13, 32-33 ( 1938). 
110. See Wilson, Unsrrucrured Delegarion of Legis/alive Power and rhe Modern Bureau-
crauc Srare: Can and Should rhe Brig Aurora be Safe(v Brough! Back info Harbor.~ 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, 
Colo. (Sept. 2-5, 1982). 
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and what is not and to prevent favoritism in dealing with parties 
similarly situated.''' 
Finally, the concept of a nondelegation doctrine, arising from 
a general right to liberty, is compatible with the recent decisions 
hinting at a sliding scale of permissible delegation, that is, as legis-
lation approaches the frontier of an individual right, the courts 
have required greater clarity of purpose.112 If the closer the law 
approaches a fundamental right, the more specific it must be, then 
it reasonably follows that some degree of specificity is required 
before there is abridgment of a general right to liberty. 
IV. CONCLUSION: SLOUCHING TOWARD 
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY 
Neither by delegating essential legislative authority nor by re-
serving it to itself can Congress fulfill its constitutional duty to 
legislate. By slouching toward rather than performing its constitu-
tional duty, Congress has brought into being a regime so cavalier 
towards the general right to liberty and the commitments of citi-
zenship, so distinct from the guiding principles of the Constitu-
tion, that the most recent edition of a famous inquiry into the 
nature of public authority in America''3 now concludes that we 
live under the "Second Republic of the United States." Perhaps 
overly dramatic, the conclusion, by pointing to the change in re-
gime rather than "social and economic forces," does properly em-
phasize the role of deliberate human choice.''4 
Although legislative vetoes and delegations of essentially 
standardless authority are not inevitable responses to modem so-
cial and economic circumstances, they have given congressmen 
such electoral advantages that it would be foolishly sanguine to 
expect reform to come from Congress itself. Positioned above the 
ordinary political process, endowed with the tools of a tradition, 
and charged with constitutional responsibility, it is up to the Court 
to make the deliberate choices that will bring constitutional form 
to, and hence make respectable,11s the currently uncouth legisla-
tive process which prevails through delegation and reservation of 
authority. While the Court chose correctly in Chadha, it articu-
lated poorly. Proper reflection on that decision, however, should 
Ill. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE; A PRELIMINARY iNQUIRY 217-19 (1969). 
112. See. e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 ( 1958). 
113. See T. Lowi, supra note 55. 
114. On the "debilitating" effect of attributing problems to an anthropomorphized "so-
ciety," see E. BRANN, PARADOXES OF EDUCATION I!'< A REPUBLIC 2-3 (1979). 
i 15. See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text. 
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lead the Justices to see the logical necessity of revitalizing the doc-
trine of nondelegation. 
